"Gatekeeper" or "Colluder": Financial Background of Executives and Corporate R&D Manipulation

As a core strategic element for enterprises to build sustainable competitive advantages, R&D innovation plays a significant role in the construction of national innovation systems and the process of high-quality economic development. However, the phenomenon of corporate R&D manipulation has shown a gradually emerging trend. Such behavior not only undermines the authenticity of accounting information but also leads to structural imbalances in the allocation of innovation resources, thereby impairing long-term corporate innovation capabilities. Based on data from China's A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2023, this study thoroughly investigates the impact of executives' financial background on corporate R&D manipulation and its underlying mechanisms. The findings reveal that executives with financial backgrounds can significantly reduce the level of corporate R&D manipulation, and the power of the chairman positively moderates this relationship. This inhibitory effect is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises and regions with higher tax enforcement intensity. Mechanism analysis indicates that financially experienced executives primarily curb R&D manipulation by improving information disclosure quality and alleviating corporate financing constraints. Further research shows that the inhibitory effect of financially experienced executives on R&D manipulation can promote both the quantity and quality of corporate innovation. This study provides a new perspective for understanding the dual mechanisms of executives' professional backgrounds in R&D manipulation governance and offers micro-level support for improving corporate innovation service systems and strengthening strategic objectives such as intellectual property protection.